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Abstract
As pharmaceutical expenditure continues to rise, third-party payers in most high-income countries
have increasingly shifted the burden of payment for prescription drugs to patients. A large body of
literature has examined the relationship between prescription charges and outcomes such as
expenditure, use, and health, but few reviews explicitly link cost sharing for prescription drugs to
efficiency and equity. This article reviews 173 studies from 15 high-income countries and discusses
their implications for important issues sometimes ignored in the literature; in particular, the extent
to which prescription charges contain health care costs and enhance efficiency without lowering
equity of access to care.
1. Background
The notion that user charges improve efficiency is
regarded by some as self-evident. Not only do user charges
reduce the welfare loss caused by full insurance, but they
also help to contain health care costs, encourage patients
to choose more cost-effective forms of care, and are a val-
uable source of revenue for the health system. Yet there is
growing evidence to suggest that the reverse might be true.
Although user charges consistently lower health care use
and, if carefully designed, can steer patients towards cost-
effective care, they do not lead to long-term control of
pharmaceutical spending and seem unlikely to contain
total expenditure on health (not least because they can
threaten patients' health). In spite of research suggesting
that user charges are unlikely to contribute to health pol-
icy goals such as efficiency and equity, all OECD countries
charge patients for some health services, most commonly
for prescription drugs. The universal application of pre-
scription drug charges in OECD countries may reflect anx-
iety about the rapid growth of pharmaceutical budgets
[1], although many of these countries applied prescrip-
tion drug charges before rising drug budgets became a
pressing policy matter. Table 1 gives details of different
forms of prescription drug charges.
This article reviews the literature on user charges for pre-
scription drugs in high-income OECD countries with a
view to assessing their impact on efficiency and equity.
The substantial body of literature on prescription drug
charges already includes several reviews. However, the
remit of most of these reviews is constrained by a focus
on, for example, specific populations [2-4]; a sub-set of
the literature such as studies from the United States, the
United Kingdom, and/or Canada [5-9]; specific forms of
prescription drug charges such as reference pricing [10,11]
and tiered formularies [12]; or the main articles in the area
[7,13-16]. We add to existing reviews by covering studies
carried out in a wider range of high-income countries and
reviewing papers published in languages other than Eng-
lish. We also go beyond them in attempting to assess the
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relationship between prescription drug charges, effi-
ciency, and equity. The article begins with a brief overview
of economic and policy arguments in favour of user
charges. It then describes the methods we used to identify
relevant literature and notes some of the limitations of
our approach. After reviewing the literature, we conclude
with a discussion of policy implications.
2. How can user charges improve efficiency?
Before reviewing the literature, we outline some key eco-
nomic and policy arguments in favour of user charges as a
means of improving efficiency. Understanding these argu-
ments may help to explain why user charges continue to
be advocated, even when there is substantial evidence of
their potentially detrimental effect on both efficiency and
equity. We also define what we mean by efficiency and
equity.
Willingness to pay and welfare loss
Economic arguments in favour of user charges are based
on the concept of allocative efficiency, which deems
resources to be efficiently allocated when people are will-
ing to pay for a commodity at a price that reflects the mar-
ginal cost of producing the commodity [17]. This has two
ramifications. First, only those who are willing to pay
should have access to a particular commodity. Second,
providing a harmful or ineffective commodity to those
willing to pay for it is efficient, whereas providing an effec-
tive and beneficial commodity to those unable to pay for
it is inefficient. For example, if the presence of health
insurance means that health care is free at the point of use,
the consumption of health care will not reflect the mar-
ginal costs of its production, leading to welfare loss since
scarce resources might be better spent on producing and
consuming other commodities [18]. User charges redress
this loss by reinstating price: those willing to pay the price
may use health care, those unable to pay must do without.
From an economic perspective, any reduction in the use of
health care following the introduction of user charges
contributes to allocative efficiency, regardless of the distri-
butional or health consequences.
We might ask what relevance allocative efficiency has for
policy making in health care. If it is to be understood as a
normative concept, then we must assume either that the
distributional and health consequences are of no impor-
tance or, if they are important, that all individuals in a
given society share the same level of income, the same
tastes and preferences, and the same risk of ill health, etc.
[17,19]. But neither assumption reflects reality. Policy
Table 1: Direct and indirect forms of prescription drug charges and their incentives
Form Definition Patient incentives
Direct
Co-payment The user pays a fixed fee (flat rate) per item or service. The patient may decrease the volume of drugs consumed or 
may decrease the number of prescriptions filled while 
increasing the size of each prescription. The patient has no 
incentive to consume cheaper drugs unless co-payments are 
lower for these drugs.
Co-insurance The user pays a fixed proportion of the total cost, with 
the insurer paying the remaining proportion.
The patient may decrease the volume of drugs consumed and 
may only request a larger pack size if this produces savings. 
The patient has an incentive to consume cheaper therapeutic 
medications.
Deductible The user bears a fixed quantity of the costs, with any 
excess borne by the insurer; deductibles can apply to 
specific cases or to a period of time.
When patients are not close to the deductible level, they may 
decrease the volume of drugs consumed and/or switch to 
cheaper therapeutic alternatives. As they near the deductible 
limit, they have an incentive to consume more drugs and 
more expensive drugs to push themselves over the 
deductible.
Indirect
Reference pricing (RP) A reference price refers to the maximum price for a 
group of equal or similar drugs that the insurer will 
reimburse the user. If the user chooses a drug that 
costs more than the reference price, he or she must 
pay the difference.
The patient is likely to decrease his or her consumption of 
drugs that are priced above the reference price and switch to 
alternative drugs priced at or below the reference price.
Differential charges
Multi-tier formularies Typically, these contain two or three tiers. The first 
tier consists of generic drugs, which have the lowest 
co-payment. The second and third tiers generally 
comprise brand-name drugs, which can be split into 
preferred and non-preferred drugs (where non-
preferred drugs are the most expensive in the tier). 
Multi-tier formularies are most commonly used in the 
United States.
The patient has an incentive to switch from brand-name 
medications to generic medications and from non-preferred 
medications to preferred medications.International Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:12 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/12
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makers in all OECD countries show demonstrable con-
cern for population health and equity of access to health
care, albeit to varying degrees, while the people living in
these countries experience different levels of income and
health. We therefore prefer to use a definition of efficiency
that explicitly refers to the external criterion of health
improvement. Under this definition, an efficient alloca-
tion of health care resources would be one that maximises
health gain, where health gain is measured in a standard-
ised manner (for example, through quality-adjusted life
years) [20]. For equity, we consider two dimensions.
Equity in finance requires richer people to pay more for
health care, as a proportion of their income, than poorer
people [21]. Equity of access to health care implies access
to health care based on need rather than ability to pay.
Because equity of access is difficult to measure, most stud-
ies employ equal use of health care as a proxy for equal
access, as we do in our concluding discussion.
Containing health care costs
Economic theory would consider any reduction in use
attributed to user charges as an improvement in allocative
efficiency, regardless of the value or effectiveness of the
health services foregone. However, many non-economists
assume that, faced with user charges, rational consumers
will forego the health services of least benefit to them (cer-
tainly those that are potentially harmful and perhaps
those that are less effective). In this way, they argue,
reduced use will not adversely affect health, but will help
to contain costs and make health care more effective. Does
this assumption hold? If patients do not have sufficient
information to make rational choices, they may forego or
delay useful treatment, perhaps damaging their health
and leading to greater expenditure at a later date. Con-
versely, patients may turn to free (but more resource-
intensive) forms of health care to avoid paying charges.
The result might be higher rather than lower health care
costs.
Improving efficiency by raising revenue
User charges can raise revenue for the health system if they
are set low enough not to deter significant amounts of use.
This policy argument is more prevalent in low-income
countries, where public resources for health care may be
severely limited or non-existent. Under such circum-
stances, drawing on private resources to ensure an ade-
quate supply of drugs, for example, could lead to health
improvement, particularly if poorer people are exempt
from user charges. In high-income countries it is hard to
see how private finance could be more efficient (in con-
tributing to health improvement) than public finance.
Unless user charges exempt high users of health care, they
are really a form of tax on people in poor health.
Concern for efficiency or concern for third party payer 
budgets?
Which of these arguments in favour of user charges seems
most convincing in the case of prescription drug charges?
Applying the allocative efficiency argument to a form of
health care that requires a doctor's prescription only
underlines its irrelevance to health policy. The focus on
patient use seems misplaced when it is doctors who make
the decision to prescribe drugs. If charges are not applied
across all health services, the use of substitutes for pre-
scription drugs (often emergency care) may increase costs.
This leaves the revenue-raising argument, which, as we
have noted, is barely plausible in high-income countries.
Is it possible, then, that the real reason third party payers
impose prescription drug charges is to contain their own
budgets by shifting costs to patients? And is this why so
many countries exempt particular groups of people from
paying prescription drug charges, in the hope that cost
shifting will not adversely affect health? By studying pol-
icy outcomes, we may be able to provide an indirect
answer to these and other questions.
3. Methods and limitations
We used existing literature reviews as the basis for our
search, electronically tracing them forward in time by
looking for studies that cited the articles we collected. We
also searched the Internet and databases such as PubMed,
EconLit, Blackwell's Synergy and Ingenta using combina-
tions of the keywords shown in Table 2. In-country
experts helped to identify some of the papers in languages
other than English, which were then translated by col-
leagues. To enhance comparability we limited our search
to articles focusing on high-income OECD members
(Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
the United Kingdom and the United States). We included
any study that assessed the impact of any form of cost
sharing for prescription drugs, including reference pricing,
as well as studies that analyzed the impact of insurance
coverage on prescription drug use. We did not include
review articles or articles published after 2006.
The review covers 173 articles (from 15 countries), 17 of
which are in languages other than English. The most com-
mon country studied is the United States (US) and the
most commonly-used US datasets are the Medicare Cur-
rent Beneficiary Survey, the National Medical Expenditure
Survey, the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, Medic-
aid claims data, and other administrative claims datasets.
Most non-US studies also use data from administrative
claims or national surveys.International Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:12 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/12
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We use tables to summarise our main findings and cite
references, using the text for more detailed discussion. As
a measure of quality, the tables specify the type of study
carried out, the type of data analyzed, and the techniques
used for analysis. Some studies are experimental (ES),
some are based on a natural experiment (NS), and others
are observational (OS). Data analysis is cross-sectional
(CD), time-series (TD), or panel (time-series, cross-sec-
tional) (PD). As most researchers used large datasets, we
do not include information on sample size. The majority
of studies used regression techniques to analyze data (R),
but some reported descriptive statistics alone (NR). We do
not go beyond this in assessing the quality of the research
we review, mainly because efforts to determine the most
appropriate method of analysis for each study depend on
the study's objectives and sample characteristics.
A number of limitations are worth highlighting. No data-
set is perfect. Analyses based on cross-sectional data may
suffer from omitted variable bias (failure to account for
explanatory variables), which can lead to biased coeffi-
cients and standard errors in the regressions [22]. The sta-
tistical methods used can also affect the quality of the
results. For example, endogeneity may be an issue if indi-
viduals who are more likely to purchase insurance are also
more likely to increase their consumption of prescription
drugs once they have insurance, leading to biased and
inconsistent estimates as well as invalid statistical tests
[22]. Sample selection may be an issue where the depend-
ent variable is only observed for a restricted, non-random
sample. Regression estimates that do not account for sam-
ple selection will be biased because the researcher is una-
ble to determine whether non-consumption is due to an
individual not needing a prescription or due to an indi-
vidual choosing not to purchase a prescription. Finally,
few studies are able to determine whether dosage size
changes in response to a price change, while few datasets
give researchers insight into how doctors ease a patient's
out-of-pocket burden or how cost sharing affects adher-
ence to treatment.
4. The literature on prescription drug charges
We ask a range of policy questions relating to expenditure,
use, and health to structure our review and to pave the
way for discussion of the impact of prescription drug
charges on efficiency and equity. First, we ask whether pre-
scription drug charges affect expenditure on prescription
drugs. If there is no effect on total prescription drug
expenditure, then we conclude that prescription drug
charges result in cost shifting from publicly or privately
pooled pre-payment to patient payment at the point of
use. This has clear implications for equity in finance and
equity of access to care. Second, where there is some
reduction in total expenditure on prescription drugs, we
ask whether this is matched by any reduction in total
health care expenditure or partially or wholly offset by
increases in other health care costs. Third, we investigate
whether reductions in prescription drug expenditure are
caused by reductions in price or quantity. In the case of
price, we ask whether the prescription drug charges were
designed to encourage patients to choose lower-cost alter-
natives (for example, through reference pricing or tiered
co-payments). In the case of quantity, we ask which
patients are most likely to forego drugs and which drugs
are most likely to be foregone. Finally, we consider the
likely impact of prescription drug charges on health.
4.1. How do prescription drug charges affect expenditure 
on prescription drugs?
In this section we consider two types of expenditure: total
prescription drug expenditure and patients' out-of-pocket
expenditure. If patients are not particularly sensitive to
changes in the price of prescription drugs, introducing or
increasing user charges will have little effect on total pre-
scription drug expenditure but will increase out-of-pocket
spending on prescription drugs. Conversely, if patients are
sensitive to changes in price, the impact on total expendi-
ture will be greater, while the impact on out-of-pocket
expenditure may be smaller as patients lower their use of
prescription drugs.
Sixty-three papers examined the impact of cost sharing on
total or out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditure using
aggregate and non-aggregate data (see Tables 3 and 4).
Aggregate data is defined as data collected at the macro-
economic level so that individual- or household-specific
information is not identifiable. The co-payment levels
studied ranged from $0.50 to $35; co-insurance rates
ranged from 0% to 95%. Most studies found that higher
cost sharing lowered total prescription drug expenditure.
Expenditure reductions ranged from a non-significant
0.04% of total prescription drug expenditure when mov-
ing from a two-tier to a three-tier formulary [23] to 58%
of expenditure on ACE inhibitors when moving from a
one-tier to a two-tier formulary [24]. Variation in the mag-
nitude of expenditure reductions was influenced by con-
Table 2: Keywords used to search for literature
Main keyword Combined with these keywords
cost sharing health
user charges prescription drugs
user fees medical care
co-payments medical services
co-insurance utilization
deductibles access
reference pricing compliance
insurance adherence
insurance coverage
reimbursementInternational Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:12 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/12
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textual factors such as the size of the increase in user
charges, the type of drugs associated with user charges,
and the population groups subject to user charges. Some
studies calculated expenditure elasticities to measure the
extent of the change in total prescription drug expenditure
in response to changes in the level of cost sharing. Most
expenditure elasticity estimates ranged from -0.29 to -0.06
(that is, a 10% increase in cost sharing would result in a
0.6% to 2.9% decrease in total expenditure). The largest
expenditure elasticity estimate (-1.07), a clear outlier, was
from a study that focused on older people in the United
States without any form of protection from user charges
(for example, through employer-sponsored additional
coverage or Medicaid, the publicly financed health insur-
ance program for the poor), which may explain why this
group was relatively sensitive to price [25]. Studies exam-
ining the impact of reference pricing found that it lowered
prescription drug expenditure in the short term (generally
in the first one or two years), but had little effect beyond
this period.
In general, the literature also found that having any form
of insurance coverage (as opposed to none) increased
total prescription drug expenditure. However, a Canadian
study found that the provision of free prescription drugs
for individuals aged 65 and over did not increase total pre-
Table 3: The impact of prescription drug charges on total prescription drug expenditure
Variable Expenditures Studies
Co-payment - Hanau and Rizzi [87] (IT, NS, TD, R); Joyce et al. [88] (US, OS, CD, R); 
Lurk et al. [27] (US, NS, CD, R); Meissner et al. [66] (US, OS, CD, NR); 
Reeder and Nelson [61] (US, NS, TD, R); Smith [89] (US, OS, CD, R)
Multi-tier formulary (vs. 1- or 2-tiers) - Fairman et al. [23] (US, NS, CD, R); Gibson et al. [90] (US, NS, PD, R); 
Huskamp et al. [24] (US, NS, CD, R); Kamal-Bahl and Briesacher [91] 
(US, OS, CD, R); Motheral and Fairman [28] (US, NS, CD, R); Motheral 
and Henderson [63] (US, NS, CD, R); Nair et al. [92] (US, NS, TD, R); 
Thomas et al. [93] (US, OS, CD, NR)
Co-insurance - Alignon and Grignon [94] (FR, OS, CD, NR); Almarsdóttir et al. [95] (IC, 
NS, TD, R); Klaukka et al. [96] (FI, NS, CD, R); Liebowitz et al. [48] (US, 
ES, CD, R); Newhouse [49] (US, ES, CD, R)
Deductible - Van Vliet [97] (NE, OS, CD, R); Van Vliet [98] (NE, OS, CD, R)
Mixed system - Gaynor et al. [99] (US, OS, PD, R); Hong and Shepherd [46] (US, OS, CD, 
NR); Klick and Stratmann [25] (US, OS, CD, R); Smart and Stabile [100] 
(CA, NS, CD, R); Thomas et al. [93] (US, OS, CD, NR)
Mixed system 0 Grootendorst [26] (CA, NS, PD, R)
Reference pricing (short-term effect) - Anderson et al. [59] (SW, NS, TD, R); Grootendorst et al. [64] (CA, NS, 
TD, R); Grootendorst et al. [101] (CA, NS, TD, R); Mabasa and Ma [39] 
(CA, NS, CS, NR); Marshall et al. [42] (CA, NS, TD, R); Narine et al. [44] 
(CA, NS, TD, NR); Puig-Junoy [102] (SP, NS, TD, R); Schneeweiss et al. 
[103] (CA, NS, TD, NR)
Reference pricing (short-term effect) 0 Ulrich and Wille [104] (GE, NS, TD, NR)
Reference pricing (long-term effect) 0 Grootendorst and Stewart [105] (CA, NS, TD, R); Marshall et al. [42] 
(CA, NS, TD, R); Schneeweiss et al. [106] (CA, NS, TD, R)
Change from
co-payment to co-insurance - Contayannis et al. [107] (CA, NS, CD, R)
co-insurance to deductible and co-insurance - Contayannis et al. [107] (CA, NS, CD, R)
Insurance coverage
Primary (vs. none) + Artz et al. [108] (US, OS, CD, R); Danzon and Pauly [109] (US, OS, CD, 
NR); Gianfrancesco et al. [110] (US, NS, CD, NR); Smith and Garner 
[111] (US, NS, CD, NR)
Supplementary (vs. none) + Davis et al. [112] (US, OS, CD, NR); Dourgnon and Semet [113] (FR, OS, 
CD, R); Federman et al. [114] (US, OS, CD, R); Lillard et al. [115] (US, OS, 
CD, R); Long [116] (US, OS, CD, R); Poisal and Murray [117] (US, OS, CD, 
NR); Raynaud [118] (FR, OS, CD, R); Stuart et al. [119] (US, OS, CD, R); 
Weeks [120] (US, NS, CD, NR)
Supplementary (vs. none) + Yang et al. [71] (US, OS, CD, R)
Supplementary (vs. none) 0 Grignon and Perronin [121] (FR, NS, CD, R)
Public supplementary (vs. private) + Raynaud [118] (FR, OS, CD, R)
Prescription limit - Soumerai et al. [37] (US, NS, TD, R)
Country: CA = Canada; FI = Finland; FR = France; GE = Germany; IC = Iceland; IT = Italy; NE = The Netherlands; MC = multiple countries; SP = 
Spain; SW = Sweden; US = United States
Type of study: ES = experimental study; NS = natural study; OS = observational study
Type of data analyzed: CD = cross-sectional data; TD = time-series data; PD = panel data
Type of statistical analysis used: R = regression techniques; NR = no regression techniquesInternational Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:12 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/12
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scription drug expenditure [26]. This result may be related
to the fact that the author was only able to control for the
unhealthiest respondents in the first year of the sample.
Alternatively, additional insurance may have had no effect
as people approaching this age were already using pre-
scription drugs for chronic conditions. All except one [27]
of the studies that examined the impact of user charges on
patients' out-of-pocket expenditure on prescription drugs
found that user charges increased patients' costs, while
having additional voluntary health insurance coverage
lowered their costs (see Table 5).
Thus, there is some evidence to suggest that cost sharing
leads to slightly lower total expenditure or lower expend-
iture growth on prescription drugs and higher out-of-
pocket expenditure for patients. The finding that patients
are relatively insensitive to changes in the price of pre-
scription drugs has important implications. Few of the
studies we reviewed were of sufficient duration to permit
assessment of long-term expenditure control. However,
the reference price studies that took a slightly longer per-
spective found that reference pricing had little effect on
expenditure beyond the first year or two, which suggests
that user charges may not be relied upon to reduce phar-
maceutical budgets in the long term. It also indicates that,
rather than substantially lowering total expenditure on
prescription drugs, user charges shift some prescription
drug costs from third party payers to patients.
4.2. How do prescription drug charges affect total health 
care expenditure?
If user charges lower total expenditure on prescription
drugs, they might also lower total expenditure on health
care. Conversely, they could lead to a squeezed balloon
effect, causing expenditure to rise in other parts of the
pharmaceutical sector or health system. To assess the
impact of prescription drug charges on total health care
expenditure, we consider 23 papers that examined the
relationship between prescription drug charges and the
use of other forms of health care (a proxy indicator for
expenditure) such as over the counter (OTC) drugs, doc-
tor and outpatient visits, and inpatient and emergency
care (see Table 6).
As the use of prescription drugs requires a doctor's pre-
scription, in most cases we would expect prescription drug
charges to result in lower use of doctors (to the extent that
patients are sensitive to changes in price). Several studies
found that user charges, reimbursement limits, and refer-
ence pricing did indeed lead to a reduction in doctor vis-
its; three studies found that prescription drug charges had
no effect on doctor visits; and one study found that they
increased doctor visits. However, two of the three studies
finding no relationship between prescription drug charges
and doctor visits examined situations in which user
charges were designed to encourage the use of lower-cost
drugs through multi-tier formularies [28] or differential
charges for generics and brand-name medications [29],
rather than to lower the use of prescription drugs. In the
third of the three studies, the insignificant effect on doctor
visits may be explained by the fact that everyone in the
study sample had experienced a heart attack, while those
with lower incomes were afforded greater protection from
prescription drug charges [30]. Consequently, this group
was less likely to be sensitive to changes in price and per-
haps more likely to see the doctor for reasons other than
to obtain a prescription. The positive result came from a
sample of older people in Canada with rheumatoid arthri-
tis [31]. As health insurance in Canada fully covers doctor
visits, it is not surprising that some patients would substi-
tute physician care for prescription drugs.
Studies show mixed results for OTC drugs. In the RAND
experiment, higher co-insurance rates lowered the proba-
bility of purchasing an OTC drug but, after controlling for
this, cost sharing had no impact on OTC expenditure [32].
Additional insurance coverage led to higher use of pre-
scription drugs compared to OTC drugs in another US
study [33], but had the opposite effect in a French study
[34]. The French result probably differed because addi-
tional health insurance in France covers more than just
prescription drugs; and as doctors often recommend the
Table 4: Estimates of the expenditure elasticity of demand for prescription drugs
Paper Type of cost sharing Expenditure elasticity
Contayannis et al. [107] (CA, NS, CD, R) Change from co-payment to co-insurance -0.16 to -0.12
Klick and Stratmann [25] (US, OS, CD, R) Mixed system -1.07
Phelps and Newhouse [122] (CA/UK, OS, CD, NR) Co-insurance -0.07a
Smart and Stabile [100] (CA, NS, CD, R) Mixed system -0.29 to -0.28
Van Vliet [97] (NE, OS, CD, R) Deductible -0.06
Van Vliet [98] (NE, OS, CD, R) Deductible -0.08
aunadjusted elasticity estimate (no regression used)
Country: CA = Canada; NE = The Netherlands; UK = United Kingdom; US = United States
Type of study: NS = natural study; OS = observational study
Type of data analyzed: CD = cross-sectional dataInternational Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:12 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/12
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use of OTC drugs, increased OTC drug use may have been
prompted by increased doctor visits. Having a limit on the
number of free prescriptions an individual is allowed per
month (a policy most often associated with Medicaid in
the United States) positively influenced the quantity of
OTC drugs used [35].
The results for outpatient, inpatient, and emergency care
are much more consistent. As expected, user charges
designed to encourage patients to choose lower-cost drugs
had no significant effect on the use of inpatient or emer-
gency care [28,36]. Otherwise, with the exception of four
studies, there was generally a positive relationship
between cost sharing and outpatient, inpatient, and emer-
gency care. Studies also found that prescription limits
increased the frequency of partial hospitalisation [37] and
nursing home admissions [38] and the use of emergency
mental health services [37]. Two of the studies that found
no effect were based on chronically ill patients [30,38].
Soumerai et al. [38] also suggest that their insignificant
result for inpatient admissions might be due to the fact
that the outcome variable they used (time to first hospital
admission) would not highlight repeat hospital visits.
These findings reveal two things. First, prescription drug
charges are unlikely to lower total health care expenditure
and may in fact increase spending overall. Although a
decline in the use of services that complement prescrip-
tion drugs (doctor visits) may lead to cost savings, any sav-
ings are likely to be outweighed by increased use of the
highly resource-intensive services that substitute for pre-
scription drugs (inpatient, emergency and long-term
care). Second, the design of a cost sharing policy can mit-
igate this potentially explosive effect on total health care
expenditure. Policies that give patients incentives to
switch to lower-cost drugs and policies that protect low-
income groups may prevent inefficient patterns of health
care use which, while more accessible to patients, are
more costly to the health system.
4.3. Is lower prescription drug expenditure achieved 
through reductions in price or quantity?
In this section we return to the question of total prescrip-
tion drug expenditure and consider whether expenditure
reductions resulting from user charges are achieved
through reductions in the price of prescription drugs or
reductions in the quantity of prescription drugs con-
sumed. From a policy perspective, lowering expenditure
through reductions in price would be preferable because,
as the previous sections have shown, reductions in quan-
tity can have unwelcome consequences for total health
care costs and for equity (unless user charges exclusively
reduce the use of unnecessary or ineffective prescription
drugs).
Reductions in price
The effect of user charges on price reductions can be direct
if reference pricing or tiered formularies encourage manu-
facturers to lower pharmaceutical prices, or indirect if they
encourage patients to consume lower-priced prescription
drugs. Fifteen studies examined direct or indirect price
reductions attributed to prescription drug charges. For
example, a Canadian study found that when a private
insurer introduced a maximum allowable cost drug plan
(similar in effect to reference pricing) for proton pump
inhibitors, the price of inhibitors that were more expen-
sive than the reference price fell [39]. A German study
found that reference pricing led manufacturers to lower
the price of medications in several therapeutic categories,
with the largest reductions for brand-name drugs [40].
Danzon and Liu [41] found similar results for Germany,
New Zealand, and the Netherlands. However, savings
achieved through price reductions under reference pricing
may be limited because manufacturers generally have no
incentive to price products below the reference price. Sav-
ings may also be offset if, as has been observed, manufac-
turers respond to reference pricing by increasing the price
of drugs not included in the reference pricing scheme
[10].
Table 5: The impact of prescription drug charges on patients' out-of-pocket expenditure on prescription drugs
Variable Out-of-pocket expenses Studies
Co-payment + Stuart and Zacker [123] (US, OS, CD, R)
Co-payment 0 Lurk et al. [27] (US, NS, CD, R)
Multi-tier formulary (vs. 1- or 2-tiers) + Huskamp et al. [124] (US, NS, CD, R); Huskamp et al. [125] (US, NS, 
CD, R); Kamal-Bahl and Briesacher [91] (US, OS, CD, R)
Reference pricing + Grootendorst et al. [101] (CA, NS, TD, R)
Insurance coverage
Supplementary (vs. none) - Alan et al. [69] (CA, OS, CD, R); Alan et al. [68] (CA, OS, CD, R); Alan 
et al. [126] (CA, OS, CD, R); Blustein [127] (US, OS, CD, R); Federman 
et al. [114] (US, OS, CD, R)
Reimbursement limit + Tseng et al. [128] (US, OS, CD, NR)
Country: CA = Canada; US = United States
Type of study: ES = experimental study; NS = natural study; OS = observational study
Type of statistical analysis used: R = regression techniques; NR = no regression techniquesInternational Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:12 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/12
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There is more evidence about the way in which patients
respond to incentives to switch to cheaper prescription
drugs (see Table 7). Three studies that considered the
impact of reference pricing found that patients immedi-
ately switched from drugs priced above the reference price
to drugs priced at the reference price [42-44]. A study of
the impact of differential co-payments for different statins
(cholesterol-lowering drugs), ranging from $0 to $52.51,
also found that patients were more likely to choose the
cheapest option [45]. However, other studies that exam-
ined incentives to switch from brand-name to generic
drugs show mixed results. Where user charges vary accord-
Table 6: Prescription drug charges and the demand for other health services
Good/service affected Variable Effect Study
OTC drugs Co-insurance - Liebowitz [32] (US, ES, CD, R)
Insurance coverage
Supplementary (vs. none) + Caussat and Glaude [34] (FR, OS, CD, R)
Supplementary (vs. none) - Stuart and Grana [33] (US, OS, CD, R)
Prescription limit + Cox et al. [35] (US, OS, CD, R)
physician services Co-payment - Anis et al. [129] (CA, OS, PD, R); Balkrishnan et al. 
[130] (US, NS, PD, R); Lauterbach et al. [131] (GE, 
OS, CD, R); Winkelmann [132] (GE, NS, PD, R); 
Winkelmann [133] (GE, NS, CD, R)
Co-payment 0 Gardner et al. [29] (US, NS, TD, R)
Multi-tier formulary (vs. 1- or 2-tiers) 0 Motheral and Fairman [28] (US, NS, CD, R)
Reference pricing - Hazlet and Blough [36] (CA, NS, TD, R)
Mixed system + Li et al. [31] (CA, NS, PD, R)
Change from
co-insurance to deductible and co-
insurance
0 Pilote et al. [30] (CA, NS, CD, R)
Insurance coverage
Public Supplementary (vs. private) + Raynaud [134] (FR, OS, CD, R)
Reimbursement limit - Hsu et al. [135] (US, OS, PD, R)
outpatient services Co-payment + Balkrishnan et al. [130] (US, NS, PD, R)
Mixed system + Gaynor et al. [99] (US, OS, PD, R)
Insurance coverage
Public supplementary (vs. none) + Raynaud [134] (FR, OS, CD, R)
inpatient services Co-payment + Anis et al. [129] (CA, OS, PD, R); Atella et al. [76] 
(IT, NS, CD, R); Balkrishnan et al. [130] (US, NS, 
PD, R)
Co-payment 0 Gardner et al. [29] (US, NS, TD, R)
Reference pricing 0 Hazlet and Blough [36] (CA, NS, TD, R)
Multi-tier formulary (vs. 1- or 2-tiers) 0 Motheral and Fairman [28] (US, NS, CD, R)
Mixed system 0 Gaynor et al. [99] (US, OS, PD, R)
Insurance coverage
Supplementary (vs. none) - Schoen et al. [74] (US, NS, CD, NR)
Public supplementary drug (vs. private) - Lingle et al. [136] (US, OS, CD, R)
Prescription limit 0 Soumerai et al. [38] (US, NS, TD, R)
Prescription limit + Soumerai et al. [37] (US, NS, TD, R)
Reimbursement limit + Hsu et al. [135] (US, OS, PD, R)
ER visits Multi-tier formulary (vs. 1- or 2-tiers) 0 Motheral and Fairman [28] (US, NS, CD, R)
Reference pricing + Hazlet and Blough [36] (CA, NS, TD, R)
Change from
co-payment to co-insurance and annual 
maximum
+ Tamblyn et al. [72] (CA, NS, TD, R)
co-insurance to deductible and co-
insurance
0 Pilote et al. [30] (CA, NS, CD, R)
Reimbursement limit + Hsu et al. [135] (US, OS, PD, R)
Prescription limit + Soumerai et al. [37] (US, NS, TD, R)
emergency mental health services Prescription limit + Soumerai et al. [38] (US, NS, TD, R)
nursing home admissions Prescription limit + Soumerai et al. [38] (US, NS, TD, R)
Country: CA = Canada; FR = France; GE = Germany; IT = Italy; US = United States
Type of study: ES = experimental study; NS = natural study; OS = observational study
Type of data analyzed: CD = cross-sectional data; TD = time-series data; PD = panel data
Type of statistical analysis used: R = regression techniques; NR = no regression techniquesInternational Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:12 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/12
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ing to patients' insurance coverage, higher charges for
brand-name drugs were successful in increasing demand
for generic drugs [46,47]. In contrast, the RAND experi-
ment found that co-insurance had no effect on the use of
generic drugs [48,49], perhaps because generic substitutes
were both less prevalent and more expensive in the United
States during the 1970s and 1980s than they are at present
[50]. More recent studies examining the impact of multi-
tier formularies also found little impact on the use of
generic substitutes, although there was some increase in
the use of other therapeutic substitutes in the preferred
tier. One reason for this may be that the studies focused
either on an increase in user charges associated with a for-
mulary or on a change from a two-tier to a three-tier for-
mulary. While price-sensitive patients respond to an
initial change from a one-tier to a two-tier formulary by
increasing their uptake of generic drugs, patients who are
less sensitive to price may continue to use brand-name
drugs [51]. Subsequent price differentials between gener-
ics and brand-name drugs have little effect on the less sen-
sitive group, but may encourage switching from non-
preferred to preferred brand-name drugs.
Overall, there is some evidence to suggest that reference
pricing might be effective in encouraging drug manufac-
turers to lower their prices to the reference price, perhaps
leading to a one-off reduction in expenditure on drugs in
the reference pricing scheme. However, these savings may
be offset by increases in the prices of cheaper drugs in the
reference pricing scheme (to match the reference price)
and increases in the price of drugs outside the reference
pricing scheme. Evidence of the impact of patient-targeted
incentives is mixed and, again, suggests the potential for
minor and one-off cost savings only.
Reductions in quantity
Quantity can be affected by a decrease in the probability
of consuming prescription drugs and/or a decrease in the
volume (number) of prescription drugs consumed.
Impact on probability of use
Twenty-four articles used individual- or household-level
data to examine the effect of prescription drug charges or
insurance coverage on the probability of using any pre-
scription drugs (see Table 8). The co-payments studied
ranged in price from $0–$3 to approximately $33, and co-
insurance rates ranged from 0% to 95%. With the excep-
tion of a Danish article [52], the studies were unanimous
in finding that individuals who faced prescription drug
charges were less likely to use prescription drugs and that
those with insurance coverage were more likely to use
them. The single unexpected result may be related to the
fact that the authors did not control for endogeneity (in
this case, the greater likelihood of unhealthier patients
purchasing additional private health insurance) [52].
Only one study compared prescription drug consumption
among individuals facing a change in the level of user
charges (from a CDN $237 deductible and a 40% co-
insurance rate to an income-based deductible with 0% co-
insurance above the deductible; families with an annual
income below CDN $15,000 faced a lower deductible)
[53]. The change did not lead to any increase in the prob-
ability of consumption among low-income children, but
did lower the probability of consumption among higher-
income children. The income-based deductible therefore
increased the out-of-pocket burden for higher-income
households, but still proved to be a deterrent to the use of
prescription drugs among lower-income households.
Table 7: The impact of prescription drug charges on the use of generic or reference-priced drugs
Variable Use of generics Use of other substitutes Studies
Co-payment N/A + Esposito1 [45] (US, OS, CD, R)
Multi-tier formulary (vs. 1- or 2-tiers) 0 + Huskamp et al. [125] (US, NS, CD, R); Motheral and 
Fairman [28] (US, NS, CD, R)
Multi-tier formulary (vs. 1- or 2-tiers) 0 N/A Gibson et al. [90] (US, NS, PD, R); Motheral and 
Henderson [63] (US, NS, CD, R)
Multi-tier formulary (vs. 1- or 2-tiers) N/A + Kamal-Bahl and Briesacher [91] (US, OS, CD, R); 
Landsman et al. [65] (US, NS, TD, R);
Co-insurance 0 N/A Liebowitz et al. [48] (US, ES, CD, R); Newhouse [49] 
(US, ES, CD, R)
Mixed system + N/A Hong and Shepherd [46] (US, OS, CD, NR); 
Mortimer [47] (US, OS, CD, R)
Reference pricing (non-RP drugs) + N/A Marshall et al. [42] (CA, NS, TD, R); McManus et al. 
[43] (AU, NS, TD, R); Narine et al. [44] (CA, NS, TD, 
NR)
Reference pricing (non-RP drugs) N/A + Mabasa and Ma [39] (CA, NS, CS, NR)
Country: AU = Australia; CA = Canada; US = United States
Type of study: ES = experimental study; NS = natural study; OS = observational study
Type of data analyzed: CD = cross-sectional data; TD = time-series data; PD = panel data
Type of statistical analysis used: R = regression techniques; NR = no regression techniquesInternational Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:12 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/12
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Impact on volume
The bulk of the literature (92 studies) focuses on the
impact of user charges on the volume of prescription
drugs used (see Table 9). The co-payments studied ranged
from $0–$3 to the full price of the drug. Co-insurance
rates ranged from 0% to 100%. Most studies found a neg-
ative relationship between the prescription drug charge
and levels of prescription drug use, regardless of the form
of user charge in place. In most cases, insurance coverage
had a positive effect on the volume of prescription drugs
used, whereas the existence of a limited list of prescription
drugs qualifying for reimbursement had a negative effect
[54,55].
Only 12 studies deviated from these intuitive findings to
show either a positive correlation between out-of-pocket
prescription drug price and volume [56] or no significant
effect. In some cases this was due to study design. For
example, studies found that cost sharing had a positive or
no effect on the use of prescription drugs among groups
of older people [56,57], among nursing home residents
[58], among patients with chronic conditions [30,59,60],
where user charges were low [59-62], or when patients
were able to switch to cheaper alternatives. Older people
are more likely to suffer from life-threatening and/or
chronic conditions and may therefore be less sensitive to
price. They may also perceive fewer substitutes for pre-
scription drugs and, in some cases, decisions about drug
use may be made by carers rather than the patients them-
selves [58]. The introduction of multi-tier formularies and
reference pricing may negatively affect the volume of
drugs that become relatively more expensive, but gener-
ally have little impact on overall volume as patients switch
to less expensive drugs rather than curbing their consump-
tion [63,64].
Several studies calculated estimates of the elasticity of
demand for prescription drugs (or provided enough infor-
mation for us to calculate estimates), with the aim of
measuring the extent of patients' responsiveness to
changes in the out-of-pocket price of prescription drugs
(see Table 10). Overall, the demand for prescription drugs
was almost always inelastic (less than proportionate).
Studies generally found that a 10% increase in price
would result in a 0.2 to 5.6% decrease in use based on
non-aggregate data or a 0.6 to 8.0% decrease in use based
on aggregate data. Estimates based on aggregate data are
slightly larger due to higher levels of 'noise'. One study
found an elastic decrease in use of 11.5% for tricyclic anti-
depressants, but inelastic decreases of 1.0 to 6.0% for
Table 8: The impact of prescription drug charges on the probability of obtaining a prescription drug
Variable Probability of use Studies
Co-payment - Esposito1 [45] (US, OS, CD, R); Gardner et al. [137] (NZ, 
OS, CD, NR); Hillman et al. [138] (US, OS, CD, R); Stuart 
and Zacker [123] (US, OS, CD, R); Watt et al. [139] (NZ, 
OS, CD, NR)
Co-insurance - Lohr et al. [140] (US, ES, CD, NR)
Deductible - Blais et al. [141] (CA, NS, TD, R)
Mixed system - Goldman et al. [142] (US, OS, CD, R); Ozminkowski et 
al. [143] (US, OS, CD, R); Smart and Stabile [100] (CA, NS, 
CD, R)
Change from:
deductible and co-insurance to income-based deductible - Kozyrskyj et al. [53] (CA, NS, CD, R)
Insurance coverage
Primary (vs. none) + Smith and Garner [111] (US, NS, CD, NR); Thomas et al. 
[144] (US, OS, CD, R)
Supplementary (vs. none) + Adams et al. [145] (US, OS, CD, R); Blustein [127] (US, OS, 
CD, R); Caussat and Glaude [34] (FR, OS, CD, R); 
Coulson and Stuart [146] (US, OS, CD, R); Genier et al. 
[147] (FR, OS, CD, R); Grignon and Perronin [121] (FR, 
NS, CD, R); Raynaud [148] (FR, OS, CD, R); Raynaud [134] 
(FR, OS, CD, R); Rogowski et al. [149] (US, OS, CD, R); 
Stuart and Grana [33] (US, OS, CD, R)
Supplementary (vs. none) 0 Christiansen et al. [52] (DK, OS, CD, R)
Supplementary public (vs. private) + Raynaud [148] (FR, OS, CD, R); Raynaud [134] (FR, OS, 
CD, R)
1This study examined the probability of using a specific statin compared to the probability of using other statins when there were differing co-
payments for each statin.
Country: CA = Canada; DK = Denmark; FR = France; NZ = New Zealand; US = United States
Type of study: ES = experimental study; NS = natural study; OS = observational study
Type of data analyzed: CD = cross-sectional data; TD = time-series data; PD = panel data
Type of statistical analysis used: R = regression techniques; NR = no regression techniquesInternational Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:12 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/12
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Table 9: The impact of prescription drug charges on the volume of prescriptions obtained
Variable Volume Studies
Co-payment - Anderson et al. [59] (SW, NS, TD, R); Anessi Pessina [150] (IT, OS, TD, R); 
Anis et al. [129] (CA, OS, PD, R); Balkrishnan et al. [130] (US, NS, PD, R); 
Begg [151] (UK, OS, CD, NR); Birch [152] (UK, NS, CD, NR); Brenna et al. 
[153] (IT, NS, TD, R); Brian and Gibbens [67] (US, ES, CD, NR); Cameron 
et al. [154] (AU, CD, NS, R); Delnoij et al. [155] (NE, NS, CD, R); Gardner 
et al. [137] (NZ, OS, CD, NR); Gardner et al. [29] (US, NS, TD, R); Hansen 
et al. [156] (US, OS, CD, R); Harris et al. [157] (US, NS, TD, R); Hughes and 
McGuire [158] (UK, NS, TD, R); Hux et al. [159] (CA, NS, CD, R); Johnson 
et al. [160] (US, NS, CD, R); Johnson et al. [161] (US, NS, CD, R); 
Lauterbach et al. [131] (GE, OS, CD, R); Lavers [162] (UK, NS, TD, R); 
Livingstone et al. [163] (CA, NS, CD, NR); Lundberg et al. [164] (SW, OS, 
CD, R); Lurk et al. [27] (US, NS, CD, R); McManus et al. [165] (AU, NS, TD, 
R); Nelson et al. [166] (US, NS, TD, R); O'Brien [54] (UK, NS, TD, R); 
Reeder and Nelson [61] (US, NS, TD, R); Ryan and Birch [55] (UK, NS, TD, 
R); Schneeweiss et al. [167] (CA, NS, TD, R); Scott et al. [168] (US, NS, CD, 
NR); Smith and Watson [169] (UK, OS, CS, R); Starmans et al. [170] (NE, 
NS, TD, R); Watt et al. [139] (NZ, OS, CD, NR)
Co-payment 0 Anderson et al. [59] (SW, NS, TD, R); Meissner et al. [66] (US, OS, CD, 
NR); Reeder and Nelson [61] (US, NS, TD, R); Soumerai et al. [62] (US, 
NS, TD, R)
Multi-tier formulary (vs. 1- or 2-tiers) 0 Motheral and Henderson [63] (US, NS, CD, R)
Multi-tier formulary (vs. 1- or 2-tiers) - Fairman et al. [23] (US, NS, CD, R); Gibson et al. [90] (US, NS, PD, R); 
Landsman et al. [65] (US, NS, TD, R); Motheral and Fairman [28] (US, NS, 
CD, R); Rector et al. [171] (US, OS, CD, R)
Co-insurance - Foxman et al. [172] (US, ES, CD, R); Johnson et al. [160] (US, NS, CD, R); 
Johnson et al. [161] (US, NS, CD, R); Liebowitz et al. [48] (US, ES, CD, R); 
Lohr et al. [140] (US, ES, CD, NR); Martin and McMillan [173] (US, NS, TD, 
R); Puig-Junoy [174] (SP, OS, TD, R); Steffensen et al. [175] (DK, NS, CD, 
NR)
Deductible - Blais et al. [141] (CA, NS, TD, R); Socialstyrelsen [176] (SW, OS, CD, NR)
Mixed system - Carrin and Van Dael [177] (BE, OS, TD, R); Gaynor et al. [99] (US, OS, PD, 
R); Grootendorst and Levine [56] (CA, OS, CD, R); Hong and Shepherd 
[46] (US, OS, CD, NR); Klick and Stratmann [25] (US, OS, CD, R); Li et al. 
[31] (CA, NS, PD, R); Van Vliet et al. [178] (NE, OS, CD, R)
Mixed system + Grootendorst and Levine [56] (CA, OS, CD, R)
Mixed system 0 Mott and Schommer [179] (US, OS, CD, R); Ong et al. [60] (SW, NS, TD, 
R)
Reference pricing (overall) 0 Grootendorst et al. [64] (CA, NS, TD, R)
Reference pricing (overall) - Mabasa and Ma [39] (CA, NS, CS, NR); Schneeweiss et al. [106] (CA, NS, 
TD, R)
Reference pricing (non-RP drugs) - Grootendorst et al. [64] (CA, NS, TD, R); Mabasa and Ma [39] (CA, NS, 
CS, NR); Marshall et al. [42] (CA, NS, TD, R); McManus et al. [43] (AU, NS, 
TD, R); Narine et al. [44](CA, NS, TD, NR)
Change from
co-payment to co-insurance - Van Doorslaer [180] (BE, NS, TD, R)
co-payment to co-insurance and annual maximum - Tamblyn et al. [72] (CA, NS, TD, R)
co-insurance to deductible - Friis et al. [181] (DK, NS, CD, NR)
co-insurance to deductible and co-insurance - Blais et al. [182] (CA, NS, TD, R)
co-insurance to deductible and co-insurance 0 Blais et al. [57] (CA, NS, TD, R); Pilote et al. [30] (CA, NS, CD, R)
Insurance coverage
Primary (vs. none) + Artz et al. [108] (US, OS, CD, R); Coulson and Stuart [146] (US, OS, CD, 
R); Danzon and Pauly [109] (US, OS, CD, NR); Fillenbaum et al. [183] (US, 
OS, CD, R); Gianfrancesco et al. [110] (US, NS, CD, NR); Grootendorst et 
al. [184] (CA, OS, CD, R); Shih [185] (US, OS, CD, R); Smith and Garner 
[111] (US, NS, CD, NR)
Primary (vs. none) 0 Stuart et al [58] (US, OS, CD, R)
Supplementary (vs. none) + Caussat and Glaude [34] (FR, OS, CD, R); Coulson and Stuart [146] (US, 
OS, CD, R); Coulson et al. [186] (US, OS, CD, R); Davis et al. [112] (US, OS, 
CD, NR); Fillenbaum et al. [183] (US, OS, CD, R); Greenlick and Darsky 
[187] (CA, OS, CD, NR); Grootendorst et al. [184] (CA, OS, CD, R); Poisal 
and Chulis [188] (US, OS, CD, NR); Poisal and Murray [117] (US, OS, CD, 
NR); Rudholm [189] (SW, OS, CD, R); Stuart et al. [119] (US, OS, CD, R); 
Weeks [120] (US, NS, CD, NR)International Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:12 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/12
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other types of drug [65]. The evidence indicates that while
patients are more sensitive to the price of brand-name
drugs than to the price of generic drugs, the price elasticity
of demand for the former is still relatively inelastic
[47,63]. The Canadian study based on a sample of older
people (see the previous paragraph) calculated a positive
price elasticity estimate, suggesting that a 10% increase in
price would actually lead to a 1.4% increase in use [56]. A
further explanation for this may be that doctors attempted
to ease the burden of higher prescription drug charges by
increasing the size of prescriptions or prescribing cheaper
drugs. The only other positive estimate came from a study
that did not control for other factors that may have influ-
enced demand, which may have biased the authors' calcu-
lation [66].
The evidence presented in this section shows that user
charges reduce the use of prescription drugs, but not by
much. In general, patients are relatively insensitive to
changes in the out-of-pocket price of prescription drugs.
The following sections focus on the sort of prescription
drugs patients are most likely to forego and the type of
patients most likely to respond to prescription drug
charges.
4.4. What sort of prescription drugs are patients most 
likely to forego?
Policy makers often assume that patients will forego the
use of drugs they value the least first and are therefore
more likely to forego the use of non-essential than essen-
tial prescription drugs. Studies that considered this ques-
tion generally defined essential drugs as those primarily
used in the management of chronic conditions in which
the cessation of drug therapy would have potentially seri-
ous consequences or as drugs that prevent deterioration in
health or prolong life. Most studies found that prescrip-
tion drug charges lowered the use of essential and non-
essential drugs (see Table 11), although reductions in the
use of non-essential drugs were usually slightly larger.
This suggests that patients may attempt to discriminate on
the basis of the usefulness of the prescription drug in
question but are not always able to judge appropriately.
Only one study found that cost sharing had little impact
on the use of drugs classified as important for the treat-
ment of serious illnesses or critical or necessary [67].
However, the study only reported descriptive statistics,
and the small effect may have been due to the low level of
the co-payment involved ($0.50 in 1971 dollars for the
first two prescriptions in a month).
The finding that cost sharing reduces the use of essential
as well as non-essential drugs suggests that, if policy mak-
ers are concerned about the impact of user charges on
health (see below), they should not rely on patients to
make the 'right' decisions about which drugs they may or
may not forego.
4.5. Which patients are most likely to reduce their use of 
prescription drugs?
Prescription drug charges may adversely affect some
groups of people more than others (for example, poorer
people and heavy users of prescription drugs). Very few
studies provide direct comparisons of reductions in pre-
scription drug use among different population groups.
However, Canadian researchers found that the introduc-
tion of additional insurance coverage lowered the propor-
tion of a patient's budget spent on prescription drugs for
older households with low and high levels of out-of-
pocket spending on prescription drugs [68]. A later study
confirmed this result and also found that among non-eld-
erly households, the additional insurance coverage low-
ered out-of-pocket spending on prescription drugs more
for low-income households than for high-income house-
holds [69]. This suggests that poorer households were
most affected financially by user charges. At least in this
context, it also indicates that increased user charges
shifted expenditure from the government to poorer
households. There was another interesting finding relat-
ing to specific types of insurance coverage. Although we
might expect older Medicaid beneficiaries to spend more
on prescription drugs than others due to the correlation
between age, income, and health [70], poorer Medicare
beneficiaries who were also eligible for Medicaid actually
had lower prescription drug expenditure than those with
Medicare only [71] (Medicare is the public insurance pro-
gram for those aged 65 and above in the United States).
This may be due to cost containment measures imposed
by Medicaid, such as prescription restrictions and the use
of formularies. A study that specifically addressed differ-
ences in essential drug consumption by income found
that welfare recipients experienced greater reductions in
Limited list - O'Brien [54] (UK, NS, TD, R); Ryan and Birch [55] (UK, NS, TD, R)
Prescription limit - Soumerai et al. [62] (US, NS, TD, R); Soumerai et al. [37] (US, NS, TD, R)
Reimbursement limit - Hsu et al. [135] (US, OS, PD, R)
Country: AU = Australia; BE = Belgium; CA = Canada; DK = Denmark; FR = France; GE = Germany; IT = Italy; NE = The Netherlands; NZ = New 
Zealand; SP = Spain; SW = Sweden; UK = United Kingdom; US = United States
Type of study: ES = experimental study; NS = natural study; OS = observational study
Type of data analyzed: CD = cross-sectional data; TD = time-series data; PD = panel data
Type of statistical analysis used: R = regression techniques; NR = no regression techniques
Table 9: The impact of prescription drug charges on the volume of prescriptions obtained (Continued)International Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:12 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/12
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essential drug use than older people, even when there was
an annual out-of-pocket maximum in place [72].
Other studies indirectly compared sensitivity to prescrip-
tion drug charges among different groups by comparing
price elasticity estimates. Among the general population,
price elasticity estimates showed that a 10% increase in
price would lead to a 0.2 to 4.6% decrease in use based on
non-aggregate data and a 0.9 to 8.0% decrease in use
based on aggregate data. Changes in use for older people
ranged from a 5.6% reduction to a 0.9% increase based on
non-aggregate data, and the only study using aggregate
data found a reduction of 5.1% [62]. Meanwhile reduc-
tions in use for poorer people ranged from 0.3 to 2.0%
based on non-aggregate data and 0.5 to 4.0% based on
aggregate data. These estimates suggest that poorer and
older people are not more sensitive to price, in contrast to
earlier literature reviews which found that poorer people
were most sensitive and older people least sensitive to
price [2,5]. Our results may differ due to newer estimates
or estimates not considered in the earlier reviews. How-
ever, new statistical techniques such as meta-regression
analysis also indicate that large variations in elasticity esti-
mates may be influenced by publication bias (where jour-
nals favour papers with significant elasticity values), study
characteristics, and institutional settings [73]. It is there-
fore difficult to make inferences regarding the distribu-
tional consequences of user charges based on elasticity
estimates alone.
The few studies that have directly compared changes in
the use of prescription drugs (in response to user charges)
among different age or income groups have generally
found that poorer people are more likely to lower their
use when faced with higher prices. But there is a need for
more research in this area, as the indirect evidence pro-
vided by elasticity estimates produces different results.
Table 10: Estimates of the elasticity of demand for prescription drugsa
Paper Type of cost sharing Price elasticity
Anessi Pessina [150] (IT, OS, TD, R) Co-payment -0.75 to -0.07
Carrin and Van Dael [177] (BE, OS, TS, R) Mixed system -0.35 to --0.09
Coulson and Stuart [146] (US, OS, CD, R) Primary insurance (vs. none) --0.18b
Gardner et al. [29] (US, NS, TD, R) Co-payment -0.38 to --0.23
Gibson et al. [90] (US, NS, PD, R) Multi-tier formulary (vs. 1- or 2-tiers) -0.27 to --0.03
Grootendorst and Levine [56] (CA, OS, CD, R) Mixed system -0.40 to 0.14
Grootendorst et al. [184] (CA, OS, CD, R) Supplementary insurance (vs. none) -0.13b to --0.09b
Harris et al. [157] (US, NS, TD, R) Co-payment -0.17b to --0.06b
Hughes and McGuire [158] (UK, NS, TD, R) Co-payment -0.37 to -0.32
Klick and Stratmann [25] (US, OS, CD, R) Mixed system -0.56
Landsman et al. [65] (US, NS, TD, R) Multi-tier formulary (vs. 1- or 2-tiers) -1.15 to -0.10
Lavers [162] (UK, NS, TD, R) Co-payment -0.22
Li et al. [31] (CA, NS, PD, R) Mixed system -0.20 to --0.11
Liebowitz et al. [48] (US, ES, CD, R) Co-insurance -0.10b
McManus et al. [165] (AU, NS, TD, R) Co-payment -0.80b to --0.50b
Meissner et al. [66] (US, OS, CD, NR) Multi-tier formulary (increase in co-payment for all tiers) -0.22 to 0.39
Mortimer [47] (US, OS, CD, R) Mixed system -1.91 to --0.03
Motheral and Henderson [63] (US, NS, CD, R) Multi-tier formulary (vs. 1- or 2-tiers) -0.32d
O'Brien [54] (UK, NS, TD, R) Co-payment --0.64 to --0.23
Puig-Junoy [174] (SP, OS, TD, R) Co-insurance -0.13
Ryan and Birch [55] (UK, NS, TD, R) Co-payment -0.11 to --0.09
Smith [89] (US, OS, CD, R) Mixed system -0.10
Smith and Watson [169] (UK, OS, CD, R) Co-payment -0.58c
Van Doorslaer [180] (BE, NS, TD, R) Change from co-payment to co-insurance -0.60 to --0.06
Van Vliet et al. [178] (NE, OS, CD, R) Deductible -0.02
a In some cases the authors of a paper may have reported a different kind of elasticity and where possible we have recalculated their estimates to 
reflect the standard definitions of elasticity. Whether we used an arc, point or constant elasticity calculation depended on the type of statistical 
analysis used and the kind of information reported by the authors.
bCalculated by the authors of this paper using the arc elasticity formula: ed = ((Q2 - Q1)/(Q2 + Q1))((P2 + P1)/(P2 - P1)).
cCalculated by the authors of this paper using a log-linear calculation: ed = Bj , where Bj represents the coefficient on the price variable and   is 
the mean price.
dCalculated by the authors of this paper using the point elasticity formula: ed = ((Q2 - Q1)/(Q1))((P1)/(P2 - P1))
Country: AU = Australia; BE = Belgium; CA = Canada; IT = Italy; NE = The Netherlands; SP = Spain; UK = United Kingdom; US = United States
Type of study: ES = experimental study; NS = natural study; OS = observational study
Type of data analyzed: CD = cross-sectional data; TD = time-series data; PD = panel data
Type of statistical analysis used: R = regression techniques; NR = no regression techniques
x xInternational Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:12 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/12
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4.6. How do prescription drug charges affect health?
Datasets of sufficient longitude for the analysis required
to assess the impact of user charges on health are scarce.
Consequently, there are few direct attempts to answer this
question. The RAND experiment found that there were
only small differences in adult and child health status
between those receiving 'free' care and those subject to
user charges. However, it was not able to measure the
long-term health effects of reductions in use, and few of its
studies specifically linked prescription drug charges to
health status. With regard to prescription drugs, the exper-
iment found that people with higher levels of education
used more OTC drugs and spent a larger proportion of
their drug budget on OTC products (Leibowitz 1989). If,
as this suggests, poorer people face financial and other
barriers to access to OTC drugs (a substitute for prescrip-
tion drugs), prescription drug charges are likely to have a
greater negative effect on their health status.
Some non-experimental studies have also tried to assess
the health impact of prescription drug charges. A Cana-
dian study examined the impact of a change from no co-
payment for people receiving social assistance and a small
co-payment (CDN $2) with a CDN $100 out-of-pocket
maximum for older people to 25% co-insurance with an
annual maximum prescription charge of CDN $200–
$925, depending on income [72]. The authors found that
higher prescription charges increased hospitalisation
rates, nursing home admissions, and mortality associated
with reductions in the use of essential drugs. However, a
separate study of the same change in user charges found
that cost sharing had no impact on mortality or readmis-
sions for complications among a group of older people
who had experienced a heart attack [30]. Another study
considered a natural experiment in which low-income
patients with cardiovascular disease who did not have pre-
scription drug coverage were given free drugs [74]. The
study found that average blood pressure declined among
patients with hypertension and average LDL fell among
patients receiving free lipid-lowering drugs. A study of
older people who had restricted their use of prescription
drugs due to cost found that they experienced greater
declines in health status compared with people who had
not restricted use for cost reasons [75]. An Italian study
looked at the correlation between co-payments, adher-
ence to treatment and health in a sample of hypertension
patients [76]. It found that the abolition of co-payments
lowered the mortality rate for low-adherent patients by
0.7 percentage points, but had no effect on the mortality
rate for high-adherent patients.
Other studies have attempted to address health outcomes
indirectly, examining the effect of prescription drug
charges on the use of essential vs. non-essential drugs (see
Section 3.4) and on adherence to treatment. The financial
burden imposed by user charges may induce patients to
adopt strategies that affect adherence to a particular treat-
ment regime. For example, patients may cut pills in half or
skip doses. Most of the 22 studies that focused on adher-
ence found that patients were less likely to adhere to treat-
ment when faced with a co-payment, even if the co-
payment was relatively small [77] (see Table 12). How-
ever, patients who faced co-payments were more likely to
adhere to treatment regimes for diabetes than patients
who faced co-insurance rates [78]. This difference may be
due to patients' uncertainty about how changes in the
price of drugs will affect their out-of-pocket spending
under co-insurance [78]. Patients with co-payments may
also be able to obtain larger prescriptions to avoid higher
out-of-pocket costs, an option unavailable to those with
co-insurance.
Table 11: The impact of prescription drug charges on the use of essential and non-essential medicines
Variable Use of essential 
medicines
Use of non-essential 
medicines
Studies
Co-payment - - McManus et al. [165] (AU, NS, TD, R)
Co-payment 0 Brian and Gibbens [67] (US, ES, CD, NR)
Co-insurance - - Foxman et al. [172] (US, ES, CD, R)
Change from
co-payment to co-insurance 
and annual maximum
- Tamblyn et al. [72] (CA, NS, TD, R)
Prescription limit - Fortress et al. [190] (US, NS, PD, R); 
Martin and McMillan [173] (US, NS, TD, 
R); Soumerai et al. [62] (US, NS, TD, R); 
Soumerai et al. [38] (US, NS, TD, R)
Prescription limit - Soumerai et al. [62] (US, NS, TD, R)
Country: AU = Australia; CA = Canada; US = United States
Type of study: ES = experimental study; NS = natural study; OS = observational study
Type of data analyzed: CD = cross-sectional data; TD = time-series data; PD = panel data
Type of statistical analysis used: R = regression techniques; NR = no regression techniquesInternational Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:12 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/12
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Adherence was also problematic for patients with a multi-
tier formulary (vs. a two-tier formulary) [65] and for those
who purchased non-preferred drugs in a multi-tier formu-
lary (as opposed to generic or preferred drugs) [79,80].
Having any type of insurance coverage increased adher-
ence to treatment, while the existence of a limit on the
number of reimbursable prescriptions had the opposite
effect [35,81]. The only study to find no effect on adher-
ence examined the impact of a change from a CDN $2 co-
payment to an income-related deductible (CDN $0 to
$350) and 25% co-insurance with an income-related
annual maximum (CDN $200 – $750) among a group of
people who had all had experienced heart attacks [30]. As
this paper focused on patients who were chronically ill
and had experienced an adverse event related to their ill-
ness, it is not surprising that they adhered to their treat-
ment. However, the study did not measure patients'
adherence to other medications unrelated to cardiovascu-
lar disease, and it is possible that these patients lowered
their adherence to other medications in order to be able
to pay for cardiovascular treatment.
Overall, most studies that directly or indirectly considered
the impact of prescription drug charges on health con-
cluded that they lowered or were likely to lower health sta-
tus because they led patients to forego the use of essential
drugs, reduced adherence to treatment, and increased the
likelihood of needing more intensive care and of dying. In
the RAND experiment, the health effects of user charges
(for all health services, not just prescription drugs) were
more pronounced among low-income groups, in spite of
an income-related annual maximum ceiling on out-of-
pocket expenditure. This suggests that protection mecha-
nisms do not always protect high-risk households.
5. What impact do prescription drug charges 
have on efficiency and equity?
There is no doubt that user charges reduce the use of pre-
scription drugs and, therefore, enhance allocative effi-
ciency as defined by standard welfare economics.
However, as we argued at the beginning of this article, the
unrealistic assumptions that must accompany a norma-
tive understanding of allocative efficiency limit its rele-
vance to health policy. In assessing the impact of
prescription drug charges on efficiency, we prefer an inter-
pretation of efficiency more commonly used to evaluate
policy: one that focuses on improving health through the
provision of effective health care. From this perspective,
the cost, health, and distributional consequences of pre-
scription drug charges can be seen to lower efficiency. In
the following paragraphs we examine the policy implica-
tions of each of these consequences in turn.
Implications for health care costs
Almost all the studies we review conclude that prescrip-
tion charges reduce the use of prescription drugs. How-
ever, they also show that most patients are not particularly
sensitive to changes in the out-of-pocket price of prescrip-
tion drugs. Put in economic terms, the demand for pre-
scription drugs is price inelastic. This result is not
surprising when we consider the pivotal role of doctors in
prescribing drugs, which must have some bearing on
patients' views about the necessity of taking such drugs,
even when the financial outlay involved may be high. It
may also be linked to unmeasured factors, including
patient strategies to limit costs, such as obtaining higher
doses of the same medication or cutting pills in half. But
the implications for policy are profound. Because
patients' overall response to prescription drug charges is
muted, these charges fail to achieve large or long-term
reductions in total prescription drug expenditure at the
same time as they succeed in increasing patients' out-of-
pocket spending on prescription drugs. What this suggests
is that one of the main effects of prescription drug charges
is to shift costs from third party payers (public or private)
to patients. Indeed, a policy change in the Canadian prov-
ince of British Columbia that slightly lowered prescription
drug user charges for low-income groups and substan-
tially increased them for middle- and higher-income
groups directly transferred around CDN $134 million in
prescription drug costs from the provincial government
budget to patients, leading to substantial cost savings for
the public purse [82].
There is some evidence to suggest that patients and pro-
ducers respond to policies that enable patients to choose
lower-cost drugs (for example, generic substitutes for
brand-name drugs in multi-tier formularies or drugs avail-
able at the reference price), which has some effect on total
and out-of-pocket expenditure on prescription drugs.
However, as with reductions in the quantity of drugs con-
sumed, the cost savings generated by reductions in price
are usually limited and are one-off events. Nevertheless,
by giving patients access to cheaper drugs, reference pric-
ing or tiered formularies seem to prevent patients from
turning to more expensive forms of free health care (inpa-
tient, emergency, or long-term care) as a way of avoiding
prescription drug charges. In contrast, standard prescrip-
tion drug charges lead to increased use of these resource-
intensive services, which results in higher levels of total
expenditure on health care and undermines efforts to
improve efficiency in the delivery of health care. From this
we conclude that prescription drug charges should not be
relied on to contain prescription drug costs in the longer
term, or the costs of health care more generally. We rec-
ommend that policy makers monitor the impact of pre-
scription drug charges (and other user charges) on the use
of alternative health services.International Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:12 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/12
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Implications for health
Few studies examined the impact of prescription drug
charges on health, perhaps due to the difficulty of obtain-
ing the long-term data required to do so. In general, those
that directly considered health effects concluded that pre-
scription drug charges increased the likelihood of needing
more intensive care and, ultimately, of dying. The handful
of studies that found that prescription drug charges had
no negative effect on health usually focused on the use of
drugs for chronic conditions among chronically ill peo-
ple, a group we might expect to be less likely to lower use.
A larger number of studies examined health effects indi-
rectly, looking at the impact of prescription drug charges
on adherence to treatment and the use of essential and
non-essential drugs as proxy indictors for health. Most
studies found that user charges lowered adherence to
treatment and reduced the use of essential and non-essen-
tial drugs, strongly suggesting a negative impact on health.
The finding about reduced use of essential drugs indicates
that the information asymmetry inherent in so many
aspects of health care also affects the use of prescription
drugs. Consequently, unless charging policies are specifi-
cally designed to direct patients towards or away from the
use of particular types of drugs, their effect is likely to be
indiscriminate. And if user charges adversely affect health,
it is hard to see how they can lead to efficiency gains.
Finally, reductions in the use of essential drugs suggest
that in some cases patients may be unwilling or unable to
pay for essential drugs, raising questions about equity.
Implications for equity
If a key effect of prescription drug charges is to shift the
costs of prescription drugs from public to private sources
of finance, the impact on equity in finance is highly likely
to be negative. International evidence consistently dem-
onstrates that user charges are a regressive form of health
care finance, requiring the poor to pay more for health
care as a proportion of their income than the rich [83,84].
And in OECD countries, where levels of public spending
on health care are usually high as a proportion of total
spending, user charges undermine the equity (and effi-
ciency) gains achieved by pooling financial resources
across groups of people and over time.
Prescription drug charges are also likely to lower equity in
the use of health care. Although elasticity estimates did
not show low-income groups to be more sensitive to price
than others, studies found that poorer people reduced
their use of prescription drugs even when co-payment lev-
els were very low. Low-income groups may already face
significant financial and non-financial barriers to access-
ing prescription drugs, some possibly related to other cost
control mechanisms in place, as the lower levels of drug
expenditure incurred by Medicaid beneficiaries (vs. the
privately-insured) in the United States suggest. Similarly,
while older people seem to be less sensitive to price, the
financial burden they face may be substantial if they are
heavy users of prescription drugs. In the absence of sub-
stantial research into inequity in the use of prescription
drugs, the results of studies examining inequity in the use
Table 12: The impact of prescription drug charges on adherence to treatment
Variable Compliance Study
Co-payment - Atella et al. [76] (IT, NS, CD, R); Gibson et al. [191] (US, OS, CD, R); Poirier 
et al. [77] (CA, NS, TD, NR)
Co-payment 0 Poirier et al. [77] (CA, NS, TD, NR)
Multi-tier formulary (vs. 1- or 2-tiers) - Landsman et al. [65] (US, NS, TD, R); Shrank et al. [79] (US, OS, CD, R); 
Taira et al. [80] (US, OS, CD, R)
Co-insurance - Reuveni et al. [192] (IS, OS, CD, R)
Mixed system - Ellis et al. [193] (US, OS, CD, R); Goldman et al. [194] (US, OS, CD, R); 
Mojtabai and Olfson [195] (US, OS, CD, R); Piette et al. [196] (US, OS, CD, 
R)
Change from
co-payment to deductible and co-insurance 0 Pilote et al. [30] (CA, NS, CD, R)
Has co-insurance (vs. has co-payment) - Dor and Encinosa [78] (US, OS, CD, R)
Insurance coverage
Primary (vs. none) + Kennedy and Erb [197] (US, OS, CD, NR); Piette et al. [196] (US, OS, CD, R); 
Thomas et al. [144] (US, OS, CD, R)
Primary public (vs. private) - Dodrill et al. [198] (US, OS, CD, NR)
Supplementary (vs. none) + Col et al. [199] (US, OS, CD, R); Safran et al. [200] (US, OS, CD, R); Schoen 
et al. [74] (US, NS, CD, NR); Steinman et al. [201] (US, OS, CD, R)
Prescription limit - Cox et al. [35] (US, OS, CD, R); Schulz et al. [81] (US, NS, CD, NR)
Country: CA = Canada; IS = Israel; IT = Italy; US = United States
Type of study: ES = experimental study; NS = natural study; OS = observational study
Type of data analyzed: CD = cross-sectional data; TD = time-series data; PD = panel data
Type of statistical analysis used: R = regression techniques; NR = no regression techniquesInternational Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:12 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/12
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of other forms of health care may be instructive. For exam-
ple, international research has found significant pro-rich
inequity in the use of general practitioners in the United
States and Mexico but not in other high-income countries
[85]. As prescription drug charges are more prevalent than
other user charges, we infer that inequity in the use of pre-
scription drugs may be an issue in some countries. Hori-
zontal inequity may also be an issue in countries where
prescription drug charges for low-income and older peo-
ple can vary significantly from region to region (for exam-
ple, in Canada and the United States). Further research in
this area might contribute to lowering inequity in the use
of prescription drugs and other forms of health care.
Correlations between income, age, and health [70], com-
bined with some evidence to show that poorer people are
sensitive to price and that the health effects of user charges
(for all health services, not just prescription drugs) are
more pronounced among low-income groups, suggest
that policy makers should focus on protecting poorer and
older groups and heavy users of prescription drugs from
the financial burden of user charges. In some countries
protection mechanisms in the form of exemptions or
reduced rates cover groups not considered to be particu-
larly vulnerable, such as high-income older people. This
may be motivated by dislike of the administrative costs
and stigma associated with means testing, forcing policy
makers to balance concerns for equity with concerns for
administrative efficiency and political fall-out. In other
countries voluntary insurance may be the predominant
protection mechanism, but as it only protects those who
are able to pay for it, its impact may be limited and it may
even exacerbate inequalities in access.
The extent to which protection mechanisms are effective
depends on the context, particularly the form and scope of
the protection mechanisms involved. Only a few studies
have specifically examined this issue. A Canadian study
found that a change from a fixed deductible to an income-
related deductible was not adequate to protect low-
income people [53]. Conversely, the introduction of drug
benefit programs in another part of the country did man-
age to ensure access for low-income groups [68,69].
Where protection mechanisms target groups of people,
individuals who are just above the threshold for exemp-
tion from prescription charges may be particularly disad-
vantaged. Again, few studies have explicitly addressed this
question. Most of the relevant research involves US data
and shows that individuals who are just above the Medic-
aid threshold are more likely to be uninsured than higher-
income people and may therefore face substantial access
barriers.
Policy options
The evidence we have reviewed suggests two main options
for policy makers wanting to use prescription drug charges
to improve efficiency without lowering equity. First, ena-
ble patients to opt for cheaper alternatives such as generic
vs. brand-name drugs or drugs that are cost-effective.
While the cost savings involved may be limited, these pol-
icies have the advantage of contributing to efficiency in
health care delivery. Second, introduce mechanisms to
protect poorer people and heavy users of prescription
drugs. Although research in these areas is limited, we sug-
gest that smarter cost sharing systems would be carefully
designed to ensure that protection mechanisms reflect
need, are consistently applied, and do not conflict with
other health policy goals. For example, voluntary insur-
ance only protects those who can afford it and counteracts
efforts to moderate demand, while fine-tuning exemption
schemes through greater use of targeting (usually by
means testing) may enhance equity at the expense of
administrative efficiency. As a result of expanded exemp-
tion schemes, the burden of paying for prescription drugs
may fall on the working population, who in many cases
already make a significant contribution to financing
health care. This involves economic and political trade-
offs and decisions should reflect an open debate about
values and goals. Similarly, while tiered formularies gen-
erate some cost savings, they may incur both administra-
tive and political costs, particularly if they aim to promote
cost-effectiveness.
Perhaps the smartest strategy would be to target those who
research, manufacture, prescribe, and dispense drugs.
Improvements in medical technologies (including drugs)
leading to wider use are generally acknowledged to be the
main driver of health care expenditure [86]. This implies
a need for more research on the relationship between pre-
scription drug charges and the diffusion of new technol-
ogy. It also suggests that, rather than targeting patients
through user charges, policy makers should focus on the
incentives facing pharmaceutical companies, physicians,
and pharmacists. The political economy of health systems
may not make this an attractive option, but it is these
groups who bear much of the responsibility for making
decisions about the availability, use, and cost of prescrip-
tion drugs.
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